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hose who know little about philosophy—a group that 
philosophes like to call “laymen”—would be 
forgiven for having a certain view of what philosophers 
typically worry about. No doubt, the layman thinks, 
philosophers worry about things like: “what is justice?” or: 
“how is time best understood?” or: “what does it mean to 
say something is ‘necessary’?” and things like that. But 
perception? You mean that thing that takes place when I 
simply open my eyes, there is light in the room, and I then 
have a visual experience? Philosophers worry about that?  
 
Oh, yes, they most certainly do. Indeed, as anyone who 
walked out of that introduction to philosophy course after 
the first week knows, philosophers are, and have been (I 
T 
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think it is fair to say) more or less obsessed with 
perception. Nothing, we might say, “stands for” philosophy 
more than that question, posed over and over again since 
the seventeenth century: what justifies my saying my visual 
representations of the world in fact match the world they 
purport to show? But in John Searle’s Seeing Things As 
They Are, we have a rich, compact, very smart book, which 
in turn is very much aligned with my imagined layman’s 
incredulity regarding the initial topic. You need a modest 
amount of philosophical sophistication to get there. You 
need to draw upon a fairly well worked out theory of 
intentionality overall, and you need to resist certain 
generally unchallenged dogmas regarding causation, but, in 
the end, Searle argues, (on the whole, in the opinion of this 
reviewer, quite persuasively), that there really is no 
enduring philosophical puzzle here at all. To the contrary, 
there is a straightforward account of what is going on when 
you open your eyes, an account that is quite continuous 
with what goes one when you are hungry or have a belief 
about the world that, once grasped, puts all philosophical 
questions to rest. The layman it turns out was quite right to 
be surprised. There is no deep or intractable philosophical 
puzzle, not here (not at this stage of the issue). The 
appearance of a philosophical problem, indeed the sense of 
there being an unsolvable philosophical problem, rests on 
the enduring, maddening persistence of what Searle calls 
The Bad Argument. (It is Searle who uses the capital 
letters.) When The Bad Argument is exposed for what it is 
(and I leave it to the reader to guess Searle’s estimation of 
its worth), the philosophical challenges that rest on its 
persistence quite completely disappear. There is no 
enduring philosophical problem raised by perception when 
perception is properly characterized. Well, perhaps this is 
not quite right. There is a very rich philosophical project in 
characterizing the content of perception, its intentionality. 
And Searle certainly has a lot of very interesting things to 
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say about that. But the puzzle at the center of philosophy 
since the seventeenth century, how can the purported 
truthfulness of our perceptual experience be justified? This 
so-called puzzle is no puzzle at all. In this sense, Searle’s 
title is a bit of a pun: the “things” Searle invites us to see 
rightly in Seeing Things As They Are refers not simply to 
states of affairs in the world. It is philosophical arguments 
that must be seen clearly too, and when they are so seen, set 
aside for the dark swamps that they are.  
 
THAT BAD, VERY BAD, ARGUMENT 
 
What is The Bad Argument? For Searle, of course, there 
can be no series of philosophical mistakes greater, more 
damaging, to philosophical progress, than those that attend 
virtually every theory of consciousness (10, 11). But: 
nearly as awful is the mistake that was made regarding 
perception. “A mistake of nearly as great a magnitude 
overwhelmed our tradition in the seventeenth century and 
after, and it is the mistake of supposing that we never 
directly perceive objects and states of affairs in the world, 
but directly perceive only our subjective experiences.” (11) 
It is a powerful claim: what is wrong with traditional 
philosophical accounts of perception is that it treats our 
subjective experience as itself an object of perception. Here 
is the correct, as well as intuitively plausible, account of 
perception: 
 
If you have normal vision and are in 
reasonably good light, and you look around 
you as you are reading this book, you are 
likely to see the following sorts of things: If 
you are indoors, you might see the table on 
which the book rests….If you are outdoors, 
the scene is likely to be much richer, as you 
might see trees, flowers, the sky and perhaps 
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houses and streets. I will begin by trying to 
describe obvious facts about this scene and 
your perceptions that occur in the scene. 
First, you are directly seeing objects and 
states of affairs, and these have an existence 
totally independent of your perception of 
them. The perception is direct in the sense 
that you do not perceive something else by 
way of which you perceive the scene. It is 
not like watching television or looking at a 
reflection in the mirror. The objects and 
states of affairs have an independent 
existence, in the sense that they exist 
independently of being experienced by us. If 
you close your eyes, the objects and states of 
affairs continue as before, but the perception 
ceases. Furthermore, in seeing these objects 
and states of affairs, you have conscious 
visual experiences that go on in your 
head….So there are two distinct elements: 
the ontologically objective states of affairs 
that you directly perceive and the 
ontologically subjective experiences of 
them. All this you know before you even 
start theorizing about perception. … [And] 
as soon as you begin to theorize, you will 
notice a third feature in addition to the 
objective reality and the subjective 
experience: there must be a causal relation 
by which the objective reality causes the 
subjective experience. (11, 12)  
 
The causation issue will occupy us later on. Here the 
crucial point is the claim that we see the external world 
directly; we do not see it “by way of” anything else. The 
rejection of the television or mirror analogy is I think quite 
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suggestive and quite powerful. Our perceptions have a 
content, of course, but this content is not itself the object of 
perception, (whereas the representation of something on 
television via thousands of pixels is, in that particular case, 
the object of perception). It might be tempting to think so, 
and we will soon turn to why, but this is the mistake that 
must at all costs be avoided. Indeed, once you see the 
content of the perception as itself an object of perception, 
the so-called “argument from illusion” is guaranteed, and 
so is the impossibility of having anything satisfactory to 
say in reply to it.  It is just this seemingly irresistible, and 
allegedly irrefutable, argument that purportedly prevents 
our being able to affirm Direct Realism. And so if there is 
to be any progress on this issue, clearly, this is the 
argument that must be refuted. Searle sums up the 
argument quite nicely as follows:  
 
Step One: In both the veridical (good) case 
and in the hallucination (bad) case, there is a 
common element—a qualitative subjective 
experience going on in the visual system. 
Step Two: Because the common element in 
qualitatively identical in the two cases, 
whatever analysis we give of one, we must 
give of the other. 
Step Three: In both the veridical case and in 
the hallucination case, we are aware of 
something (are conscious of something, see 
something).  
Step Four: But in the hallucination case, it 
cannot be material object; therefore, it must 
be a subjective mental entity. Just to give it a 
name, call it “a sense datum.”  
Step Five: But, by step two, we have to give 
the same analysis for both cases. So in the 
Review: Seeing Things As They Are | Ross 
 
238 
 
veridical case, as in the hallucination case, 
we see only sense data. 
Step Six: Because in both hallucinations and 
in veridical perceptions themselves we see 
only sense data, then we have to conclude 
that we never see material objects or other 
ontologically objective phenomena. So 
Direct Realism is refuted. (22—23) 
 
Indeed, this seems a pretty fair summation to me, in no 
small part because the initial power of the argument is very 
much on display. Each claim seems independently correct, 
and the last claim certainly does follow from all the ones 
before it. What could possibly be wrong? The crucial 
move, the one doing the damage, is found in step (3). The 
fallacy in the argument lies in an equivocation over what it 
means to be “aware of” or “conscious of” something. 
Searle distinguishes between the “aware of” of 
intentionality, and the “constitutive” use of the term, or, a 
use which is essentially an expression of identity. So, 
consider: (a)I am aware of this table and (b)I am aware of a 
painful sensation in my hand. In the first case, there is an 
intentional relation between me and the table; I have an 
inner state where the table is that inner state’s intentional 
object. To anticipate the general argument, and the 
connection between perception and other forms of 
representing the world (such as belief), Searle would say 
the presence of the table, and the features of the table, are 
“the conditions of satisfaction” for that state. (My 
awareness here has a distinctive intentional content, and 
this “content” also tells me what in the world would 
“satisfy” such content; i.e., make it the case that the 
perception is veridical, when it is.) By contrast, in the 
second case “the only thing I am aware of is the painful 
sensation itself.” (24) Here the “aware of” is the “aware of” 
of identity; we simply say what in fact constitutes the 
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experience. The “object” I am aware of (misleadingly so 
called), and the sensation, are identical. Keeping this point, 
this distinction, in mind when taking up the argument from 
illusion, we get the following re-description of what is 
going on:  
 
In the case of the veridical perception, I am 
literally aware of the green table, nothing 
more. But what about the hallucination? In 
the sense in which I am aware of the green 
table in the veridical perception, in the case 
of the hallucination, I am not aware of 
anything. In the ordinary sense [of seeing], 
when you are having a hallucination, you do 
not see anything [there is no object satisfying 
this content—by definition one might say -
SR], you are not aware of anything, you are 
not conscious of anything. (25) 
 
It is an understandable confusion. When we have a 
hallucination, we are of course having a conscious percep-
tual experience. And ordinary language allows us to use a 
noun phrase to describe that experience and to treat that 
noun phrase as the direct object of “aware of.” (25) In that 
sense, of course, I am “aware of” a visual experience. 
Searle has no quarrel with the forgiving nature of ordinary 
language. It is just that we must not forget that here, the 
“awareness” and “the thing we are aware of” are in fact the 
same; we are simply picking out this same mental state 
twice over. But while we use the same phrase, the same 
language of “being aware of” in the veridical perception 
case too, the story now is a very different one. Here I am 
“aware,” in a different sense, of something, of something 
quite apart from my mental state, of that which the visual 
experience describes as it were. Of course, there is always 
this other sense of “being aware of” too. I can always be 
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aware of my mental state as such. But in some cases this 
mental state has intentional content. That is the perceptual 
case. And in that case, we are aware of an object in the 
world when there is an object, and we are not aware of 
anything (in this sense of “being aware of”) when there is 
no object. Thus we can make sense of how it is that the 
veridical case and the hallucination share something 
important—as in fact they do. They share the same 
intentional content, the same conditions of satisfaction. 
That is a description of the perception’s content, as it were. 
When that content is caused by the object it describes, then, 
we can say you are aware of that object. When it is caused 
by LSD, then you are not seeing, not aware of, anything in 
the world at all. The perception has content, but it is a 
mistake to think of this content as the object of perception. 
Only what the content describes is that. (And when you are 
hallucinating, then, there is nothing in the world that 
answers to, or “satisfies” this content.) 
 
Here is another way into the same point: In both the 
sensation case and in the hallucination case, we can say, 
truthfully “There is no object in the world corresponding to 
this perception.” But in the sensation case, this is true in 
virtue of the mental category in play; it is what 
philosophers used to call a “logical” point. It is what 
follows from the sort of thing a sensation is—it does not 
have intentional content and so of course it does not have 
any intentional content that could be satisfied but here 
happens not to be. This, by the way, is very much in line 
with how Hume understood what he called the “passions,” 
which he understood as “original existences” that cannot be 
true or false. In the hallucination case, it is the exact 
opposite. Here the mental state does have content that could 
be satisfied, it just happens here not to be. So of course, the 
hallucination and the veridical perception share something. 
This is like the way in which the false belief and the true 
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belief share something—if I believe “there is a deer hiding 
behind that tree,” obviously the content of that belief is 
identical whether or not a shifting world (and a shifting 
deer) makes it true some of the time, and not true others. 
But we must not treat a feature of perception as an object of 
perception. Searle again:  
 
The reason we feel an urge to put sneer 
quotes around “see” when we describe 
hallucinatory “seeing” is that, in the sense of 
intentionality, in such cases we do not see 
anything. If I am having a visual 
hallucination of the book on the table, then 
literally I do not see anything. Since I am 
aware of something [I am conscious, after 
all—SR] the temptation is to put in a noun 
phrase to form the direct object of “see.” 
[And it seems natural to make the experience 
itself this object—SR] … This shift from 
describing the ontologically objective state of 
affairs in the world to describing the 
ontologically subjective conscious intentional 
state itself underlies the whole epist-
emological tradition. The mistake derives 
from a failure to understand the intentionality 
of conscious perceptual experience. How 
exactly? There is obviously something in 
common between the veridical perception 
and the indistinguishable hallucination. They 
are after all indistinguishable. If you fail to 
see that the something in common is a 
conscious intentional experience with 
conditions of satisfaction, you are likely to 
think that the something in common is itself 
the object of perception. That is, if you fail to 
understand the intentionality of the 
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experience, you are likely to think the 
experience is the object of the experience in 
the hallucinatory case. (26-27) 
 
What happens is this: first, there is this talk of “being aware 
of something” in both the veridical and hallucinatory cases. 
(Never mind the fact that the expression has two very 
different senses in these two cases.) Then, there is the 
framework of the perceptual context, where our perceptual 
state takes an object. Talk of perceptual states taking an 
object, and the requirement that we are “aware of 
something” in the same sense in the veridical and 
hallucinatory case drives us to say then that we are aware 
of a certain sort of “object” in both cases. Whatever could 
this be but “the experience itself”? (An object in the world 
is ruled out of course by our having to have an analysis that 
equally well fits the two cases.) And this mistake is 
especially pernicious, especially hard to root out, because it 
is of course quite natural to say we are aware of “the 
experience itself”—in the sensation context . 
 
The Bad Argument, Searle thinks, is in fact but an instance 
of more general error, an error that results from making a 
mistake about the very nature of intentionality. It is, as I 
hope is clear by now, roughly the confusion between the 
content of an intentional state and the object of that state. A 
child’s belief that Santa Claus will come to the house, and 
his belief that his father will come to the house both have 
content. But as there is no Santa Claus, the belief in the first 
case fails to refer to (or “take”) any object. Philosophers 
sometimes, in the grip of a need for symmetry, make up a 
special kind of “intentional object” for intentional states 
about non-existent things (and that is the so called “object” 
of the child’s belief in Santa Claus). But it should be pretty 
clear at this point in the argument that that is a rather sad 
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way to go. If we keep the content/object distinction clear, 
we can avoid these confusions altogether.  
 
Interestingly, when we focus on the belief case, the error 
Searle speaks of is much less likely. We see straight-
forwardly that the content of the belief, and whether or not 
there is some fact in the world the belief describes, are 
quite distinct, and we are unlikely to offer a picture of 
things that rests on taking one for the other. But, probably 
because we have this very vivid sense of our inner states 
when they are perceptions, it is easier to mistake that 
feature of the experience for the detection of an object. 
Grammar is nice enough to oblige us with an appropriately 
“fitting” way of talking, and voila! We have The Bad 
Argument, the Argument From Illusion, and the 
impossibility of Direct Realism. But Searle wants to say, 
quite persuasively I think, that the right way to carve this 
issue up requires thinking more generally about intentional 
states as such and applying what we say there to the case of 
perception. There are informative generalizations to be 
made for all intentional states where here, “intentional 
states” means not some “act of intending,” but any state 
(such as perception, or desire) that has intentional content. 
This does not mean there are not some very special features 
to perception; there are. Perception, as Searle very suggest-
ively says, is a presentation, not merely a representation. It 
has its intentional content not by convention (as a sentence 
does) but intrinsically, essentially. Many important things 
follow from this, and we will turn to at least some of them 
shortly. But still: when we recognize perception as a 
species of the larger genus, a mental state with intentional 
content, we are on the right path.  And when offering an 
analysis of intentional states generally, we must never 
confuse the content of the state with the thing in the world 
that would match it. And that distinction, that difference, 
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means keeping the two senses of what we might “be aware 
of” very distinct too.  
 
THE DISTINCT INTENTIONALITY OF PERCEPTION 
 
One of the great rewards of this book is the exceptionally 
rich analysis of what is distinctive to perception. This is a 
short book, but no time is wasted, and in Chapters 4 and 5 
(particularly 4, “How Perceptual Intentionality Works”) the 
density of the argument, the wealth of first class remarks 
coming thick and fast upon one another, is truly exemplary. 
Searle has a lot to say, and there is no point in padding. The 
result is one of the more satisfying, and edifying, reading 
experiences you are likely to have.   
 
So what is distinctive about perception? Funnily enough, 
Searle’s background in language was a great springboard for 
his view about perception. By that I mean, while Searle is 
anxious to stress affinities, where there are such affinities, 
between sentences that represent the world and perceptual 
experience, it was in gradually coming to be struck by the 
irreducible differences between language and perception that 
Searle finds the beginning of his road to a satisfactory 
account. Sure, perceptual experience represents the world all 
right, but it also does something else: it presents it; it 
presents bits of the world to us directly. And this suggestive 
way of putting “what perception is” or “what perception 
does” it is tied to what it is about perception’s intentional 
content that requires special attention.  
 
Searle has been tussling with mental states and mental 
content for some time, and, in one of the more interesting 
sections of the book, he charts out his own intellectual 
journey over the past thirty years or so, laying out the 
reasons that led him to set aside his earlier views and take 
up his current position. In Intentionality (1983) the 
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distinction between “intrinsic” and “derived” intentionality 
was already there, and already important, but one might 
say, insufficiently appreciated. For Searle, the sentence 
“there is a red ball there” has what he would call derived 
intentionality—the phonetic utterance as natural object 
clearly could have meant anything (or nothing at all); a 
convention happens to have it mean this and not that. But 
“if I literally see that there is a red ball there, my visual 
experience has intrinsic and not derived intentionality.” 
(114) And this “intrinsic” status seems to present us with 
something of a very short road when it comes to saying 
how the experience has the conditions of satisfaction that it 
does. “There seems no answer to the question how it fixes 
the conditions of satisfaction other than to say it is already 
intrinsic to the experience that it sets those conditions: it 
could not be that type of experience if it did not have those 
conditions. [On this view, -SR] the only characterization of 
the relation between the intrinsic intentionality and the state 
of affairs [that satisfies it - SR] is the trivial one of 
disquotation.” (114—115)    
 
With sentences and pictures there is a gulf between the 
object (naturalistically understood) and its conditions of 
satisfaction. This gulf actually makes it easier for us when 
offering an explanation in philosophy. The gap is crossed in 
the case of a sentence by this extra thing, the meaning of 
the sentence (and so an account of how meaning works). In 
the case of a picture, it is crossed by the representational 
features of the picture (and so an accompanying account of 
representation too). But in the case of conscious perceptual 
experience, the raw experience allows for no gulf between 
the experience and the determination of the conditions of 
satisfaction, because the conditions of satisfaction just are 
part of the experience. (115)  
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Well, to say this, that “the conditions of satisfaction” are 
“woven into” or are part of “the experience itself” might 
well seem true, or plausible, as far as it goes. But Searle 
came to find this claim (and so his view in Intentionality) 
an unsatisfactory stopping point. After all, the visual 
experience is “an event in the world like any other.” And 
so, “there ought to be a question of how it relates to its 
conditions of satisfaction, and that question has to be [or 
should be—SR] answered non-intentionalistically.” There 
must be some account of some non-intentional features of 
the visual experience that fix the conditions of satisfaction, 
or explain why the conditions of satisfaction are fixed as 
they are; otherwise we haven’t yet really explained 
anything. This is what Searle means when he speaks of the 
“trivial” nature of “disquotation,” should we say something 
like: “the condition of satisfaction just is the content of the 
visual experience, but now understood as a description of 
something in the world.” Well, that was illuminating!  
 
Searle came to think that visual experience must be 
understood “hierarchically,” where this hierarchy reflects a 
counterpart hierarchy in the objective world. So, to 
illustrate: to see this car as my car (a case of seeing rich in 
aspect), I must first see it is a specific type of car; to see it 
as “that type of car” (and clearly, it is a magnificent 
Porsche), it must have certain colors and shapes. And so 
on. Eventually we must come to a “basic” perceptual 
experience, seeing a feature you can see without having to 
perceive anything else in order to see it—very far from 
seeing that “this is my Porsche.” (Searle draws on Arthur 
Danto’s idea of a “basic action” for this idea.) But that 
there must be “basic” perceptual experiences does not yet 
give us the non-intentional description we need. We could 
hold (as Searle once did) that such basic perceptual 
experiences, basic as they may be, nevertheless can be 
characterized only in terms of their intentionality. But, to 
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repeat the earlier point—the earlier aspiration—that would 
be an unsatisfactory stopping point for Searle now. Sure, 
the perceptual experience of the basic features (or: “the 
basic perception”) has “intrinsic intentionality,” but surely 
those intrinsic intentional features are intentional in virtue 
of something. That they are basic, and that they are 
intrinsically intentional might well, and understandably, 
lead someone to think there is nothing more to be said. 
“But that is a mistake.” (117) There has to be something 
more to be said, something more about the distinctive story 
in virtue of which such basic perceptual experiences come 
about, and how, in their coming about, they are also 
intrinsically intentional. There must be a naturalistic, or 
quasi-naturalistic, account of what is going on in virtue of 
which the result is a basic perception of a basic feature that 
in turn has its conditions of satisfaction rigidly determined 
by the world.   
 
The question before us here is very much not “how is 
intentionality possible at all?” Searle does not think that is a 
terribly deep or even meaningful philosophical question. 
That is no more mysterious than how it is that an animal 
might feel thirsty (for that is state with intentional content, 
and a distinctive mind-world fit); biology and neurology 
will answer that question. The question instead is “how do 
specific features of the ontologically subjective visual field 
present features of the objective visual field as their 
conditions of satisfaction?” (118; italics added) 
 
In taking up this question, traditional analytic philosophy 
has drawn heavily on two sorts of answers: resemblance 
and causation. Searle is scornful of both, and anyone who 
has blithely appealed to these ideas in explaining how it is 
that the particular features of our perceptual experience 
pick out this, not that, bits of the world, would do well to 
review his reasons why. To begin with, any appeal to 
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“resemblance” is beset with all sorts of threshold 
difficulties. The visual experience of a red square is not 
itself red or square. But even if we leave all that aside and 
just assume, whatever that inner perceptual experience is, it 
somehow just does “resemble” the objective thing in the 
world, “resemblance by itself explains nothing.” (119) 
“The fact that there are two resembling entities does not 
make one a representation of the other in either perception 
or in language. Who sees the resemblance? My left hand 
and my right hand resemble each other as much as any two 
objects in the world, but the one is not a picture or statue or 
representation of the other.” Resemblance on its own, 
unsupplemented by a further story, can have no explanatory 
power here. Two objects “resembling” each other does not 
yet, by any stretch, give us representation, much less the 
distinctive intentional-content presentation of visual 
perception.   
 
What about causation? Well, here too, while causation is 
going to have a central role in any final story we are to 
endorse, “on its own” it has no substantive explanatory 
power. After all, “anything can cause anything” (119) and a 
causal relation is not the same as, is much weaker than, a 
relation of satisfaction. Let us suppose that seeing red 
objects caused me to feel pangs of anxiety. This would not 
make the anxiety into an intentional state that had redness 
in the world as its condition of satisfaction. The “matching” 
dimension we are looking for here, the mind-world fit 
aspect we are trying to explain, is, clearly, not going to be 
captured in a purely causal story at all. It seems obvious 
that from the fact that A causes B, this is not going to be 
enough to make B a state with intentional content that has 
A as its conditions of satisfaction. And so: “If we are going 
to show how the raw phenomenological character of the 
subjective visual experience presents its conditions of 
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satisfaction, neither resemblance nor causation by itself is 
going to do the job.” (120; italics added)   
 
Here is Searle’s theory. And it is important to emphasize 
this is indeed a theory. Searle is not saying the picture he is 
going to defend follows from some conceptual analysis of 
perception, nor is it an interesting criticism to say, or 
imagine, that things “could be” different from how Searle 
speculates they are. Things could always be different from 
how in fact they are. This is simply an account that handles, 
Searle thinks, the features of perception we most want to 
handle, congruent with what we generally want to say 
elsewhere in philosophy. We want to be able to say how the 
distinctive internal components of perceptual experience, 
the bits that (for the moment let us say) seem yellow and 
black have bits of yellow and black in the world as their 
conditions of satisfaction, and have them “necessarily.” For 
after all, when we are talking about the basic perceptual 
experience at least, this story cannot be a story that draws 
on some convention.  
 
There is red in the world, the objective stuff, and then there 
is the subjective experience, which, if we like (and, if we 
are careful) we can call the experience of red (“careful” 
because of course, this subjective experience is not itself 
colored). Searle wants to tie them together in the following 
way. For something to be red in the objective world is for it 
to be capable of causing subjective visual experiences “like 
this” (pointing, of course). But this causal relation, or 
causal capacity, is special; there is an “internal relation” 
between the fact of being red and the fact of causing this 
sort of experience. What does that mean? As a first step, as 
a matter of conceptual definition, it means this: it could not 
be, it would not be, that color if it were not systematically 
related to experiences like this. Second, for something to be 
the object of a perceptual experience is for it to be 
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experienced as the cause of that experience. “Your 
background disposition, biologically given, is to 
presuppose that the object you are perceiving is whatever 
caused the perception, and the ‘object’ in question, a token 
of the color red, consists (at least in part) in the ability to 
cause experiences like this.” (123) The experience of 
having this conscious visual experience necessarily 
“carries” the intentionality it does because the feature in 
question is experienced as caused by its object. And this 
“taking the object as the cause” is crucial to our perceptual 
life generally, not only to our visual life. If you hear a 
strange noise in the dark and do not know what it is, you 
nevertheless assume that your subjective auditory 
experience was caused by whatever it was that made that 
noise. If you run your hands over a surface (again, in the 
dark) and do not know what it is you are feeling, 
nevertheless you rightly assume whatever it is you are 
running your hand over is what is causing the subjective 
sensation you are presently experiencing. “You simply take 
it for granted that the subjective experience is caused not by 
just any objective state of affairs but by the very one that 
you are perceiving” (127). We are often blinkered in our 
treatment of causation by an unfortunate reliance on the 
Humean picture, where causation is typically pictured as 
one event (somehow) leading to another; otherwise, 
causation is simply not before us. To the contrary Searle 
argues, causation is ever present, continuous, and central to 
how we make sense of our experience. Hume famously 
speculated that causation eludes us; perhaps indeed we 
never really encounter it at all. To the contrary Searle says, 
“we experience causation pretty much all of our waking 
life” (124). This is a crucial point in the counter analysis 
Searle wants to offer. Our experience has a certain sort of 
content, but we also instinctively, naturally, take that 
content to be caused by its object. That, surely, is part of 
“the experience.” And so: subjectively, the feature of the 
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experience in question is experienced as caused by its 
object (by this the particular thing, with just this content); 
objectively, we must say this object, (this particular bit of 
red in the world) is precisely constituted by its ability to 
cause this type of experience.   
 
Have we succeeded in our initial ambition? Surely to some 
extent we have. We have said something in “non-
intentionalist” language that makes sense of why the 
subjective visual experience has the intentional content, and 
so the conditions of satisfaction, that it has. And we have 
done so by going outside the purely “internal” story. It is 
not just the account of “what is in our heads” that figures in 
the relevant story. We are also now drawing on the right 
analysis of what the world is like, how “objects of 
experience” must be characterized. Searle now says that it is 
“an essential feature” of red things in the world, for 
example, that they cause experiences like this. (We could 
equally well say the objective stuff and the experience enjoy 
an “internal” relation; i.e., it would not be red-in-the-world 
if it did not typically cause experiences of this kind.) This 
might seem a stipulative definition, but it is not. It is rather 
best thought of as a “requirement” on how we understand 
color in so far as we think of it as an objective property in 
the world. Given that an object is red, one might say, well 
then, what makes it red? The fact that makes it red, at least 
in part, is that it is capable of causing a certain sort of 
experience. (124) On the subjective side, Searle thinks he is 
pointing to a deep and insufficiently appreciated feature of 
our experience, that we take the object as its cause; that we 
experience the causation, not simply whatever it is that the 
causation story causes. Causation, the way the world forces 
itself upon us, is woven into the experience, when it is 
perceptual experience. This is what makes perception 
special, and this is what makes our knowledge of the world 
“bottom out” in perceptual experience. Searle says: “The 
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presentational intentionality of perceptual experience 
always has the cause of the experience as its object.” (125). 
Remember, the causal relation is not enough. If seeing red 
caused pain, pain does not become an intentional state with 
red things its condition of satisfaction. The specificity of the 
intentional content has to be determined by something 
essential to the visual experience. And this is what we now 
have been able to describe. If part of what it is to be that 
thing in the world (a red thing) just is to cause experiences 
“of this type,” and part of what it is to have “this (particular) 
experience” is to take the particular object one is 
experiencing as the cause, we can make sense of why the 
subjective state is like this, and most importantly, why it 
could only be satisfied by the particular object it presents 
(should there be such an object). We have indeed 
significantly improved upon mere disquotation. 
 
Notice, this account leaves open, as it should, whether the 
experience is veridical or not. To say that every conscious 
experience is experienced as a perception of the thing 
causing the experience is not to say there is always such a 
cause. The answer to that question would be established by 
a separate investigation. The right account of perception 
should not make it impossible to make sense of non-
veridical cases. Searle is most emphatically not a 
disjunctivist. But with this point in mind, a quibble, or 
emendation, is inevitable. Readers may have been puzzled 
to read Searle saying, as I quote him as saying above, “the 
presentational intentionality of perceptual experience 
always has the cause of the experience as its object.” This 
cannot be quite what he means, for if it were, he could not 
then make sense of what he wants to make sense of—the 
possibility of the non-veridical experience and the veridical 
one having the same content. I think he should say: “The 
presentational intentionality of perceptual experience 
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always takes the object of the experience as its cause.” And 
almost always, it is indeed. 
 
A final remark or two: This is, needless to say, a very 
ambitious book, and in some ways, it wears its ambition on 
its sleeve. From the start, Searle presents his arguments with 
terrific force, taking on a framework where perception is 
concerned that he argues is both widespread and pernicious. 
And he does an excellent job of making good on both these 
claims, showing the pervasiveness, and the mistakes, as 
clearly as one could wish. But there is another sense in 
which this book is ambitious, a sense not entirely clear to 
Searle or to anyone else for that matter. In this book, Searle 
offers a certain model of philosophy, of what it is to 
approach, or demystify, a philosophical problem. Of course, 
Searle spends a lot of time on past arguments and what is 
wrong with them; nothing terribly new there. But in 
addition, Searle wants to offer an account that is both 
naturalistic and yet answers the relevant normative question 
too. And the reader may be uncertain how much is solved 
with all this description. When Searle says it is just part of 
what it is to be a red thing that it causes this sort of 
experience (or if you will, a “necessary” part), and part of 
what it is to have this experience is that one takes the object 
as the cause, is he simply saying what we want to say, what 
is natural to say, from the standpoint of demystification? 
Starting with a philosophical puzzle, do we simply then 
posit the right internal-causal story that makes the puzzle go 
away and then say, it must be like this? And, if the answer 
to that question is “yes, more or less,” is that so wrong? 
Many years ago, positivists, gripped by a mistakenly 
truncated conception of language, tried to claim that many 
philosophical questions could be dismissed for failing to be 
congruent with the language of science (as it was then 
understood). Writing now in what is a kind of heyday of 
naturalism, Searle might be taken to be thinking something 
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like this: surely there is some true account of perception in 
virtue of which we really do see the real world, and 
sometimes, for all that, have hallucinations. And surely this 
account, being true, will be congruent with whatever else is 
true of persons in so far as they have other states with 
content, like beliefs or desires. This can hardly be denied or 
resisted. So, why not just try to figure out what that account 
might be, why not just spell it out? What would things be 
like if everything did make sense? Why take whatever 
philosophical positions we have inherited as constraints, in 
any way? Why not just say what must be so if we are to 
make sense of what we do—see the world, have beliefs, and 
so forth? Of course, what we say is so here, how we 
characterize the relevant mechanisms, and what we say in 
order to be able to say the other things we want to say too—
all of this will always have a whiff of the deeply contingent 
about it. The expression “it is just a fact that…” is one we 
see a great deal of in Seeing Things As They Are. But 
perhaps this is what philosophy is becoming, at least in 
those parts of it that strongly implicate our material or 
biological nature, like mind and perception. And perhaps 
“talent in philosophy” will increasingly mean talent at 
telling a non-mysterious naturalistic story, leaving the 
constructed arguments, the traps, of the past behind. It is, to 
me at least, a suggestive thought, and it marks, as I say, a 
further sense in which the argument here is very ambitious. 
It offers something of a model for how philosophy might, at 
least on subjects like this, be in the future. In the opinion of 
this reviewer, Searle certainly, and comprehensively, tells 
that story, leaving the reader quite settled with the sense that 
perception, while not simple, of course, really can be 
rendered non-mysterious. Yet, to Searle’s great credit, it is 
simply the philosophical puzzles that are tamed. It is 
another deep feature of Seeing Things As They Are, one I 
have simply set aside in concentrating on the philosophical 
arguments within it, that it is, as a matter of fact, 
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consistently faithful to what is simply magical about our 
visual life. In his discussion of paintings and landscapes for 
example, as well as in his accounts of simply looking out 
our window, Searle shows great attunement to the complex, 
fantastic, and intensely satisfying nature of our visual life. 
The ordinary, here, will always present itself, will always 
seem, extraordinary. Searle never forgets this, nor ever lets 
his reader forget it either.  
